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Abstract: Similar to what happens between humans in the real world, in open multi-agent systems distributed over the
Internet, such as online social networks or wiki technologies, agents often form coalitions by agreeing to act as
a whole in order to achieve certain common goals. However, agent coalitions are not always a desirable feature
of a system, as malicious or corrupt agents may collaborate in order to subvert or attack the system. In this
paper, we consider the problem of hidden coalitions, whose existence and the purposes they aim to achieve are
not known to the system, and which carry out so-called underhand attacks. We give a first approach to hidden
coalitions by introducing a deterministic method that blocks the actions of potentially dangerous agents, i.e.
possibly belonging to such coalitions. We also give a non-deterministic version of this method that blocks
the smallest set of potentially dangerous agents. We calculate the computational cost of our two blocking
methods, and prove their soundness and completeness.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context and motivation
Similar to what happens between humans
in the real world, in open multi-agent sys-
tems (Davidsson, 2001) distributed over the Internet,
such as online social networks or wiki technologies,
agents often form coalitions by agreeing to act
as a whole in order to achieve certain common
goals. For instance, agents may wish to collab-
orate in order to jointly create and use a group
cryptographic key for ensuring the confidentiality
and/or integrity of information shared within the
group, e.g. (Rafaeli and Hutchison, 2003), or to
partake in a mix network or some other anonymous
remailer to achieve unobservability of communi-
cations, e.g. (Chaum, 1981), or to create secret
interest groups within online social networks,
e.g. (Sorniotti and Molva, 2010). However, agent
coalitions are not always a desirable feature of a
system, as malicious or corrupt agents may collab-
orate in order to subvert or attack the system. For
instance, such agents may collaborate to attack the
information in transit over different channels in a web
service architecture or in a distributed wired and/or
wireless computer network, e.g. (Wiehler, 2004), or
they might forge and spread false information within
the system, e.g. (Hahn et al., 2007).
In order to be able to rigorously formalize
and reason about such positive and negative
properties of agent coalitions, and thereby allow
for the prevention or, at least, the identifica-
tion of the entailed vulnerabilities, a number
of different formal approaches have been re-
cently proposed, such as (A˚gotnes et al., 2007;
A˚gotnes et al., 2008; Alur et al., 1998b;
van der Hoek et al., 2005; Oravec and Fogel, 2006;
Pauly, 2001; Troquard et al., 2009;
van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005;
Wooldridge and Dunne, 2004).
In this paper, we consider the problem of hidden
coalitions: a coalition is hidden in a system when
its existence and the purposes it aims to achieve are
not known to the system. Hidden coalitions carry
out underhand attacks, a term that we borrow from
military terminology. These attacks are particularly
subtle since the agents that perform them are not out-
siders but rather members of the system whose se-
curity properties are posed under threat. Moreover,
the mere suspect that a group of individuals act as a
whole is typically insufficient to come to a decision
about their permanence as members of the system;
this, of course, depends also on the nature of the sys-
tem and the information it contains, since in the pres-
ence of highly security-sensitive information, systems
may anyway opt for the exclusion of all suspected
agents. However, in general, systems, and even more
so open ones, will want to adopt a less restrictive pol-
icy, excluding only those agents whose malice has in-
deed been proved. Therefore, the defense against un-
derhand attacks by hidden coalitions is a fundamental
but complex matter.
Problems of a similar kind have been studied, for
instance, in Game Theory (Aumann and Hart, 1994;
Pauly and Parikh, 2003) in relation to the nature of
collaboration and competition, and from the view-
point of modeling group formation under the con-
straints of possible given goals. However, underhand
attacks by hidden coalitions pose security problems
that cannot be dealt with such traditional means. Nor
can they solved by a simple, monotonic, approach
based on Coalition Logic(s) (A˚gotnes et al., 2008;
Oravec and Fogel, 2006; Pauly, 2001;
van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005), which is
currently one of the most successful formalisms for
reasoning about coalitions.
To illustrate all this further, consider the following
concrete example from an online social network such
as Facebook, where abuse, misuse or compromise of
an account can be reported to the system administra-
tion. In particular, a group of agents (in this case,
Facebook users) can report a fake profile:
You can report a profile that violates Facebook’s
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities by
clicking the “Report/Block this Person” link in
the bottom left column of the profile, select-
ing “Fake profile” as the reason, and adding
the appropriate information. [...] (Excerpt from
http://www.facebook.com/help/?search=fake)
The administrator of the system gives an ultimatum to
the agent that uses the reported profile and then may,
eventually, close it. An underhand coalition can ex-
ploit this report mechanism to attack an agent who
possesses a “lawful” original profile: at first they cre-
ate a fake profile with personal information and pho-
tos of the agent under attack, and then they become
friends of her. After that, they report the original pro-
file so that the administrator closes it. The report is
a lawful action, and by creating the new profile and
having a big enough number of agents who report the
same profile no suspicion about the hidden coalition
is raised, so that the attack succeeds.
1.2 Contributions
A formalism to define and reason about such hidden
coalitions is thus needed. Indeed, Coalition Logic al-
lows one to define coalitions that are explicit (i.e. not
hidden) and is characterized by monotonic permis-
sions to act in groups and individually. What is miss-
ing, however, is the notion of hidden coalition and a
method to block the underhand attacks such coalitions
carry out. The idea underlying our approach is to cir-
cumscribe the problem in algebraic terms, by defining
a system that can be represented by a coalition logic,
and then activate a non-monotonic control on the sys-
tem itself to block the underhand attacks that hidden
coalitions are attempting to carry out.
More specifically, we consider multi-agent sys-
tems whose security properties depend on the val-
ues of sets of logical formulas of propositional logic,
which we call the critical (or security) formulas of the
systems: for concreteness, we say that a system is se-
cure if all the critical formulas are false, and is thus
insecure if one or more critical formula is true. (Of
course, we could also invert the definition and con-
sider a system secure when all critical formulas are
true.) The system agents control the critical formu-
las in that they control the propositional variables that
formulas are built from: we assume that every vari-
able of the system is controlled by an agent, where
the variables controlled by an agent are controlled
just by that agent without interference by any other
agent. The actions performed by each agent consist
thus in changing some of the truth values of the vari-
ables assigned to that agent, which means that the
values of the critical formulas can change due to ac-
tions performed by the agents, including in particular
malicious insider agents who form hidden coalitions
to attack the system by making critical formulas be-
come true. Returning to the Facebook example, this
is exactly what happens when agents report the origi-
nal profile as fake by setting the flag (clicking on the
link).1
At each instant of time, agents ask the system to
carry out the actions they wish to perform, i.e. chang-
ing the truth value of the variables they control, and
the system has to decide whether to allow such ac-
tions, but without knowing of the existence of possi-
ble hidden coalitions and thus at the risk of the system
becoming insecure. To block such attacks, we for-
1In this paper, we do not consider how the administra-
tor decides to close the profile, nor do we consider in de-
tail the non-monotonic aspects of how agents enter/exit/are
banned from a system or enter/exit a hidden coalition, or
how members of a hidden coalition synchronize/organize
their actions. All this will be subject of future work.
malize here a deterministic blocking method, imple-
mented by a greedy algorithm, which blocks the ac-
tions of potentially dangerous agents. We prove that
this method is sound and complete, in that it does not
allow a system to go in an insecure state when it starts
from a secure state and it ensures that every secure
state can be reached from any secure state. However,
this algorithm is not optimal as it does not block the
smallest set of potentially dangerous agents.
We thus introduce also a non-deterministic block-
ing method, which we obtain by extending the deter-
ministic method with an oracle to determine the min-
imum set of agents to block so to ensure the secu-
rity of the system. We show that the soundness and
completeness result extends to this non-deterministic
method as well.
We also calculate the computational cost of our
two blocking methods. This computational analysis
is completed by determining upper bound results for
the problem of finding a set of agents to be blocked
so to prevent system transitions into insecure states,
and the problem of finding an optimal set of agents
satisfying the above condition.
1.3 Organization of the paper
In §2, we introduce our approach to the problem of
blocking underhand attacks by hidden coalitions. §3
and §4 respectively introduce our deterministic and
non-deterministic blocking methods, giving concrete
examples for their application. In §5, we study the
computational aspects of these two methods, calcu-
lating in particular their computational cost, and show
that they are both sound and complete. Finally, in §6,
we summarize our main results, discuss related work
and sketch future work.
2 An approach to the problem of
blocking underhand attacks
We introduce our approach to the problem of
blocking underhand attacks. We also recall
some basic notions and, in particular, the rele-
vant notions of the Coalition Logic of Proposi-
tional Control CL-PC (Oravec and Fogel, 2006;
van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005), which pro-
vides a starting point for our approach.
2.1 Syntax
We consider multi-agent systems S that are described
by a set of critical (or security) formulas Φ and by a
temporal sequence σ : T → Θ(Φ), with T the tempo-
ral axis and Θ(Φ) the propositional assignment in the
set of formulas. In this work, we focus only on the
formulas in Φ, which represent the security-critical
characteristics of a system (which depend on the ap-
plication and which we thus do not describe further
here, as our approach is independent of the particular
application). We say that a system is secure if all the
critical formulas are false, and it becomes insecure if
one or more φ ∈Φ becomes true.2 Hence, the state of
a system is defined by the value of the propositional
variables that occur in the critical formulas of Φ.
The agents of a system S control the set Φ and
hence the state of S . We require that there is no
formula in our systems that cannot change its truth
value. Moreover, the distribution of the variables to
the agents should be such that one formula cannot
be controlled by one single agent, but rather differ-
ent agents control one formula, and every formula is
controlled by some agents. In particular, for a set Ag
of system agents:
• every variable of the system is controlled by an
agent a ∈ Ag, and
• the variables controlled by an agent are controlled
just by that agent without interference by any
other agent.
The actions performed by each agent a ∈ Ag
are thus the changing of the truth values
of the variables assigned to a. The agents
we consider are intelligent agents in the
sense of (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995;
Wooldridge and Jennings, 1998): they are au-
tonomous, have social ability, reactivity and pro-
activeness, and have mental attitudes, i.e. states that
classify the relation of the agents and the cognitive
environment. In our approach, we consider intelligent
agents but do not make specific assumptions about
their mental attitudes, except for their collaborative
attitudes that constitute a threat to (the security of)
the system.3
In Game Theory (van der Hoek et al., 2005),
strategies are often associated with a preference
relation for each agent that indicates which output the
agent is going to select in presence of alternatives.
In our approach, agents change the value of “their”
variables according to their strategies and create
coalitions with other agents so to be more expressive:
by collaborating, agents can change the values
of different variables and thus, ultimately, of the
2As we remarked above, we could also invert this and
call a system secure when all critical formulas are true; we
would then just need to modify our methods accordingly.
3An extension of the work presented here with a detailed
formalization of the mental and collaborative attitudes of
the agents will be subject of future work.
critical formulas that comprise such variables. The
novelty in this work is that we don’t deal just with
coalitions that are known by the system but also with
hidden coalitions, whose existence and purposes are
unknown by the system.
Let us now formalize the language of our ap-
proach. Following CL-PC, given a set Ag of agents, a
set Vars of propositional variables, the usual operators
¬ and ∨ of classic propositional logic, and the coop-
eration mode✸, we consider formulas built using the
following grammar:
φ ::=⊤ | p | ¬φ | φ∨φ |✸Cφ
where p ∈ Vars, C ⊆ Ag, and ✸Cφ is a cooperation
formula. Slightly abusing notation, we denote with
Vars(φ) the set of propositional variables that occur in
φ and with Ag(φ) the agents that control the variables
in Vars(φ). ✸Cφ expresses that the coalition C has
the contingent ability to achieve φ; this means that the
members of C control some variables of φ and have
choices for φ such that if they make these choices and
nothing else changes, then φ will be true.
2.2 Semantics
A model is a tuple
M = 〈Ag,Vars,Vars|1, ...,Vars|n,θ〉 ,
where:
• Ag= {1, ...,n} is a finite, non-empty set of agents;
• Vars = {p,q, ...} is a finite, non-empty set of
propositional variables;
• Vars|1, ...,Vars|n is a partition of Vars among the
members of Ag, with the intended interpretation
that Vars|i is the subset of Vars representing those
variables under the control of agent i ∈ Ag;
• θ : Vars → {⊤,⊥} is a propositional valuation
function that determines the truth value of each
propositional variable.
Since Vars|1, ...,Vars|n is a partition of Vars, we have:
1. Vars = Vars|1 ∪ ...∪ Vars|n i.e. every variable is
controlled by some agent;
2. Vars|i ∩Vars| j = /0 for i 6= j ∈ Ag, i.e. no variable
is controlled by more than one agent.
We denote with Vars|C the variables controlled by
the agents that are part of the coalition C ⊆ Ag.
Given a model M = 〈Ag,Vars,Vars|1, ...,Vars|n,θ〉
and a coalition C, a C-valuation function is θC :
Vars|C → {⊤,⊥}. Valuations θ extend from vari-
ables to formulas in the usual way and for a model
M = 〈Ag,Vars,Vars|1, ...,Vars|n,θ〉 we write M |= φ
if θ(φ) =⊤. We write |= φ if M |= φ for all M .
2.3 Secure and insecure systems
All the semantic notions introduced above actually
depend on the current time, and we will thus decorate
them with a superscript ·St denoting the system state
at time t, e.g. θSt and |=St . Time is discrete and natu-
ral, and is defined with a non empty set of time points
T and a transitive and irreflexive relation ≺ such that
t ≺ u means that t comes before u for t,u ∈ T . In
our case, since t, t + 1 ∈ T it follows naturally that
t ≺ t + 1.
The passing of time is regulated by a general
clock, which ensures that the system can execute a
definite number of actions in an instant of time: at ev-
ery clock of time, the system changes its state, which
is thus defined by the actions that the system executes.
Even if there are no actions to execute, the system
changes its state from St to St+1, which in this case
are equal.
We assume that each system S starts, at time t0,
from a secure state S0, i.e. a state in which all the
critical formulas of Φ are false, so that none of the
features of the system is violated. In general:
S is secure at a state St iff 6|=St φ for all φ ∈ Φ
and
S is secure iff 6|=St φ for all φ ∈ Φ and all St
At time t, the system is in state St and goes to state
St+1 and executes all the actions of the agents that
want to change the value of their variables. Denoting
with Γt+1 the set of actions that the agents want to
execute at the time instant t, we can write
St
Γt+1
7−→ St+1 .
and the aim of our approach is to guarantee that each
reachable state St+1 is secure, where the differences
between St and St+1 are in their respective Θ.
Since a coalition can change the value of the vari-
ables it controls, it can attempt to change the value of
a critical formula to true; formally, for a coalition C
and a formula φ if✸Cφ is true then it means that C can
make φ true and thus the system insecure, which we
can write by negating the above definition or alterna-
tively, and basically equivalently, as:
S is insecure at a state St iff |=St ✸Cφ for some
C ⊆ Ag and some φ ∈ Φ
To help the control of the system (but without loss
of generality), we can create a filter for the actions
that imposes a limit on the number of the actions that
can be executed in an instant of time. This can de-
crease the performance of the system, so we need a
trade-off between control and performance.
Algorithm 1 A GREEDY, DETERMINISTIC BLOCK-
ING METHOD
1: Simulate(Γt+1) = [Φ′A ′];
2: while (Φ′ 6= /0) do
3: Create the matrix with Φ′ and A ′;
4: ∀ai ∈ A ′ : ai → ci,ci = count(φi);
5: Quicksort(c1, ..ck) = (cx, ...);
6: B = B ∪ ax; {where ax is the agent associ-
ated to cx, that is the maximum counter of the
marked cells}
7: Simulate(Γt+1\Γ|ax) = [Φ′ A ′];
8: end while
3 A deterministic blocking method
Our aim is to introduce a method that guarantees the
security of the system, which amounts to blocking the
actions of hidden coalitions. Indeed, in the case of
“normal” coalitions, the property ✸Cφ allows us to
list the actions of the agents in C, while if the coali-
tion is hidden then we cannot block any action as we
cannot directly identify the participants of a coalition
we do not even know to exist. Since the actions of
participants of hidden coalitions are not predictable,
we cannot oppose these coalitions using ✸, so we in-
troduce a method that disregards the existence of this
property.
Our (main) method for the protection of the sys-
tem is a blocking method based on the greedy Algo-
rithm 1: the agents make a request to the system for
the actions Γt+1 they wish to execute at time t, and the
system then simulates (via a method Simulate we as-
sume to exist) the actions in order to control whether
the system after the execution of the actions is still
secure or not. The simulation says if the system can
proceed with the execution of the actions or not, in
which case it is given a list of the formulas Φ′ that
became true along with the set of agents A ′ that made
them become true.
If the simulation says that the system can go in an
insecure state, the blocking method constructs a ma-
trix: in every column of the matrix there is one of the
agents given by the simulation and in every row there
is one of the formulas that became true during the sim-
ulation. We mark each cell that has as coordinates
the agent that has variables in that formula, and then
we eliminate the column that has more marked cells.4
4It would be more efficient to consider only the vari-
ables of the formulas that become true, but if we take only
these variables, we cannot prevent long-term strategies of
hidden coalitions, consisting in the progressive reduction of
the number of steps needed for making a security formula
The corresponding agent is not eliminated, rather he is
just blocked and his actions are not executed (by sub-
tracting Γ|ax): the “dangerous” agents found in this
way are put in a set B of blocked agents. The simula-
tion is called again and so on, until the output of the
simulation is an empty set of formulas, which means
that by executing the remaining actions the system
does not go in an insecure state. It is important to
note that this method does not prevent the creation of
hidden coalitions but can guarantee the system secu-
rity from the attacks made by these coalitions.
The most important property of Algorithm 1 is
that it never brings the system in an insecure state,
as it blocks the actions of agents that can make the
system insecure. We do not commit to a specific way
that the blocking is actually done, as it depends on
the particular observed systems and on the particular
goals. For instance:
• Block the agent from changing the value of his
variables until a precise instant of time. During
this period, his variables are left unchanged or are
controlled by the superuser/system administrator.
• Block the agent for an interval of time, which can
be a default value or can be chosen in a random
way, e.g. so that a hidden coalition doesn’t know
when the agent can be active and thus cannot or-
ganize another attack.
• Block the agent and remove his actions for that in-
stant of time. At the next instant, the agent has the
possibility to ask for his actions to be executed.
• Leave the variables unchanged, without making
known to the agent if the value of the variables
has been changed or not. This method can be
improved by blocking the agent if he attempts to
change the truth value of those variables again.
Other, more complex, blocking strategies can of
course be given, e.g. by combining some the above.
Note also that, depending on the system consid-
ered, it could be that not all the requests for execution
can be satisfied: the maximum number n of actions
that can be executed in an instant of time can be cho-
sen in different ways, with respect to the characteris-
tics of the system. Here, we choose n to be the car-
dinality |Φ| of the critical formulas. The order used
for taking these actions and executing them respects a
FIFO queue, so the first n actions are executed.
Example 1 As a concrete example of the application
of the blocking method, consider a system S defined
true. An optimization of the choice of variables to be con-
sidered in order to reduce the effectiveness of such long-
term strategies will be subject of future work.
by the critical formulas
φ1 = v1∧ v2∧ (¬v3∨ v5∨¬v4)
φ2 = (¬v5∨¬v3)∧¬v6
φ3 = v7∧ (¬v8∨¬v6)
φ4 = (v8∨ v5∨¬v9)∧ v2∧ v1
so that number of the action to be executed in an
instant of time is n = 4 (the cardinality of the set
of critical formulas that define the system), and let
Ag = {a1,a2,a3,a4,a5} and At = {v1, ...,v9}. Fur-
ther, consider the following distribution of the vari-
ables to the agents:
a1 = {v1,v7,v8}
a2 = {v3}
a3 = {v2,v6}
a4 = {v4,v5}
a5 = {v9}
Let us assume that the state St at time t is
θSt (v1) = θSt (v5) =⊥
θSt (v2) = θSt (v3) = θSt (v4) = θSt (v6) = θSt (v7)
= θSt (v8) = θSt (v9) =⊤
and that we have the following actions Γt+1 to be ex-
ecuted at time t in the FIFO queue:
θSt+1(v1) ←[ ⊤ ,
θSt+1(v3) ←[ ⊥ ,
θSt+1(v4) ←[ ⊥ ,
θSt+1(v6) ←[ ⊥ ,
· · ·
That is, v1 should be set to ⊤ at state St+1, and so
on. The algorithm simulates the first n = 4 actions, so
that Φ′ = {φ1,φ2,φ3,φ4} and A ′ = {a1,a2,a3,a4},
and the matrix of Table 1 is constructed, which the
algorithm sorts by the highest counter to produce the
matrix in Table 2. a3 is thus put into B . The simu-
lation takes place again, taking into account that we
have blocked the value of the variables controlled by
a3 at the truth value of the instant of time t. The
simulation gives as result the set Φ′ = {φ1,φ4} e
A ′ = {φ1,φ2,φ4}. The matrix of Table 3 is created,
which is already ordered (so the sorting will return the
same matrix). So, we put in B the agent a1, block its
actions and make the simulation with the remaining
actions. This simulation gives Φ′ = /0, and thus the
remaining actions can be executed without any risk
for the system S .
Table 1: Matrix constructed by the blocking algorithm for
Example 1.
a1 a2 a3 a4
φ1 X X X X
φ2 X X X
φ3 X X
φ4 X X X
Table 2: Matrix of Table 1 sorted in a decreasing order of
counters.
a3 a1 a4 a2
φ1 X X X X
φ2 X X X
φ3 X X
φ4 X X X
4 A non-deterministic blocking
method
As we will see in §5, the above deterministic block-
ing method based on a greedy algorithm is sound and
complete. However, this algorithm is not optimal as it
cannot block the smallest set of potentially danger-
ous agents. We now introduce a non-deterministic
method, which can be used for identifying optimal
solutions. The method, which is implemented in Al-
gorithms 2 and 3, is obtained by introducing an oracle
(to determine the minimum set of agents to block so
to ensure the security of the system) within the de-
terministic version, which makes the soundness and
completeness results directly applicable to the non-
deterministic version as well.
The idea is that the result given by the simulation
is passed to the method ScanOracle, which creates all
the subsets of the given set A ′ with cardinality |A ′−1|
and finds the subsets with the maximum number of
critical formulas that remain false, using the simula-
tion. The simulation of all the subsets is done in par-
allel; the ScanOracle is the non-deterministic part of
our algorithm. The result is passed to the main algo-
rithm: if we find a subset of agents such that when
executing their actions all critical formulas are false,
then we have finished and we block the remaining
agents that are not part of this subset; if not all the
critical formulas remain false the result is passed re-
cursively to ScanOracle until it is given a set of agents
such that all the critical formulas stay false when sim-
ulating their actions. The rest of the agents in A ′ that
are not part of the given subset are blocked. Using
this method, we can have different best solutions but
we choose one in a random way, where with “best so-
Table 3: Matrix of Table 2 after the block of agent a3.
a1 a2 a4
φ1 X X
φ4 X X
Algorithm 2 A NON-DETERMINISTIC BLOCKING
METHOD
1: Simulate(Γn) = [Φ′A ′];
2: I = A ′; j = 0;
3: while (Φ′ 6= /0 & I 6= /0 & j < |A ′|) do
4: I′ = ScanOracle(I);
5: For a random Ii ∈ I′
6: if |{φi |6|= φi at the current state }|= |Φ′| then
7: I = /0;
8: else
9: I = I′;
10: end if
11: j++
12: end while
13: Choose a subset Ii ∈ I′ and put A ′\Ii in B
Algorithm 3 SCANORACLE
1: Generate the subset of I with cardinality |I|− 1
2: Execute the simulation in parallel for each subset
Ii, where i ∈ {1, ..., |I|}
3: Take the Ii with the maximum number of {φi |6|=
φi} and put them in I′
4: I′ = I′∪ Ii
5: Eliminate the duplicates in I′
6: Return I′
lutions” we mean sets that have the same cardinality
and are the biggest sets that make the critical formulas
stay false, so that we block the smallest set of agents
that make the critical formulas true.
Example 2 As a concrete example of the applica-
tion of Algorithm 2 (and of Algorithm 3), consider
again the system of Example 1, with the same data.
The simulation of the first 4 actions yields again
A ′ = {a1,a2,a3,a4}, which is passed to ScanOracle,
which in turn creates the subsets:
I1 = {a1,a2,a3}
I2 = {a1,a3,a4}
I3 = {a1,a2,a4}
I4 = {a2,a3,a4}
The oracle takes these subsets and gives as results at
the current state
I1 : |= φ1 , |= φ2 , |= φ3 , |= φ4 .
I2 : |= φ1 , |= φ2 , |= φ3 , |= φ4 .
I3 : |= φ1 , 6|= φ2 , 6|= φ3 , |= φ4 .
I4 : 6|= φ1 , |= φ2 , |= φ3 , 6|= φ4 .
The two subsets with maximum number of false criti-
cal formulas are I3 and I4, so I′ = I3∪ I4. Note that,
since I3 and I4 have the same number of false formu-
las, it is enough to test just one of them to see if all the
formulas are false or not; in this case, we have just
two formulas. The ScanOracle is then called again
with I′ = I3∪ I4 and it yields the subsets
I5 = {a1,a2}
I6 = {a1,a4}
I7 = {a2,a4}
I8 = {a2,a3}
I9 = {a2,a4}
I10 = {a3,a4}
and thus the following results
I5 : |= φ1 , 6|= φ2 , 6|= φ3 , |= φ4 .
I6 : 6|= φ1 , 6|= φ2 , 6|= φ3 , |= φ4 .
I7 : 6|= φ1 , 6|= φ2 , 6|= φ3 , 6|= φ4 .
I8 : 6|= φ1 , |= φ2 , |= φ3 , 6|= φ4 .
I9 : 6|= φ1 , 6|= φ2 , 6|= φ3 , 6|= φ4 .
I10 : 6|= φ1 , |= φ2 , |= φ3 , 6|= φ4 .
Then I′ = I7∪ I9 = I7 as these two subsets are identi-
cal. Using I′, all the critical formulas are false, so it is
the maximum subset of agents with which the system
is secure. Hence, we block the remaining agents in A ′,
which is the minimum set of agents for the blocking of
which the system remains secure:
{a1,a2,a3,a4}\{a2,a4}= {a1,a3} .
5 Computational cost, Soundness
and Completeness
In this section, we calculate the computational cost of
both the blocking methods we have given, and then
show that the greedy deterministic method is sound
and complete (which implies the same for the non-
deterministic method). Recall that the maximum
number n of actions that can be executed in an instant
of time corresponds to the cardinality of the formulas
in Φ. So, in the worst case, at each instant of time,
there are n different agents that want to change the
value of n different variables.
Theorem 1 The computational cost of the greedy
blocking method, Algorithm 1, is O(n3).
Proof The simulation costs n2 because if we have n
variables and all of them are part of all the formulas,
we need to do n2 assignments. The while cycle needs
to be executed at worst n times as it blocks an agent
per cycle and we may need to block all the n agent.
The cost of a single while cycle is 3n2 due to the sum
of: the cost of the matrix creation, which is n2, the
cost of the association of the counter, which is n2, and
the cost of the quicksort algorithm, which we take to
be n2, instead of n logn (as the simulation has an n2
complexity). So, the total cost of the algorithm is n2+
(n× (3n2+ n2)) = O(n3). 
Theorem 2 The computational cost of the non-
deterministic blocking method, Algorithm 2, is O(n3).
Proof Also this algorithm uses the simulation, which
costs n2. In the worst case, we need to call the
ScanOracle (Algorithm 3) n-times, where the gen-
eration of the subsets costs n2, the oracle (that per-
forms the simulations in parallel) is linear and the
elimination of the duplicates is n2, so the cost of the
ScanOracle algorithm is O(n2). The cost of putting
the agents in B is a constant. So, the total cost of the
algorithm is n2 + n×O(n2)+C = O(n3). 
The computational cost of the non-deterministic
method implemented in Algorithm 2 is the same of
the deterministic algorithm. This can be puzzling for
the reader, who can be expecting a lower cost, since
the non-deterministic version is obtained from the de-
terministic version by using an oracle. In particu-
lar, the reduction by an oracle can be used to prove
that a problem of polynomial complexity on deter-
ministic machines can be solved in logarithmic time
on non-deterministic machines. We made a different
choice, for specific reasons. First of all, we employ
the simulation step, that is not incorporated into the
first part of the method, and thus the solution cannot
be computed in a time lower than polynomial, in a
non-deterministic fashion, even if we use, as we did,
the oracle call. As a consequence of this choice, we
could define, by using the same structure of the non-
deterministic algorithm, a variant of the algorithm in
which the solutions of the oracle are compared to each
other, to choose the optimal one.
We say that a blocking method, and thus the cor-
responding algorithm, is sound if it does not allow a
system to go in an insecure state when it starts from a
secure state S0.
Theorem 3 The greedy blocking method, Algo-
rithm 1, is sound.
Proof For the sake of contradiction, assume that the
greedy blocking method brings a system in an inse-
cure state. This means that the algorithm allowed a
Γt+1 to execute such that St
Γt+1
7−→ St+1 where St+1 is
A,B A,¬B
¬A,B ¬A,¬B
Change of the truth value of B
Change of the
truth value of A
Change of the
truth value of A
Change of the truth value of B
Figure 1: A state graph for a system with two variables.
S0
S1,1
· · ·
S1,n
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·· · ·
· · ·
S j,k
· · ·
Figure 2: A state graph with secure and insecure states.
insecure while St is secure. But, by definition, our al-
gorithm allows only transitions that bring the system
in a secure state, thanks to the simulation. 
Let us now define the notion of a state graph. Re-
call that every state of the system is defined by an as-
signment of truth values to the variables, and a state is
secure if it falsifies all security-related formulas. As
a very simple example, in Figure 1 we give the state
graph of a system with two variables {A,B}.
In general, to denote the transitions executed by a
system, we build a state graph as follows: every state
is represented as a vertex of the graph, and every pair
of vertices is connected by an edge when and only
when the two edges differ by the truth value of one
single variable, where the edge is labeled by the name
of the agent that controls that variable. The resulting
graph is indirected. In Figure 2, we give an example
of such a graph, where we omit to specify all the val-
ues of the variables for readability, but instead denote
with gray vertices the insecure states and with white
vertices the secure ones.
We say that a blocking method, and thus the corre-
sponding algorithm, is complete if every secure state
can be reached from any secure state. To prove the
completeness of the greedy blocking method, we pur-
sue the following strategy:
1. First we prove that the state graph of the system is
connected.
2. We prove that the subgraph formed by the vertices
representing secure states is connected when the
security formulas can be written as a set of Horn
clauses.
3. We prove that every formula that we consider can
be written as a disjunction of Horn clauses.
4. We show that two secure states, whose security
formulas can be written as Horn clauses, are con-
nected if and only there is a path of secure states
in the above mentioned subgraph that can be tra-
versed by the algorithm.
5. We show that the set of agents that have to be
blocked, defined by a rewriting into Horn clauses
of a security formula, is the union of agents that
control variables occurring in one single Horn
clause, and that can modify the value of the for-
mula.
6. We show that the set of agents blocked by the
greedy algorithm is a superset of the set of agents
that control variables occurring in one single Horn
clause in any rewriting of the formula.
In particular, we write H (Φ,Φ′) to denote the set
of the agents that control at least one variable of one
Horn clause in one rewriting Φ′of the security formula
Φ, in such a way that by changing the value of one of
these variables the value of the security formula can
pass from ⊥ to ⊤.
Before we carry out this sequence of proof steps,
let us observe a few simple facts that will be useful
in the following. First of all, every secure state cor-
responds to a formula, obtained as the conjunction of
the literals representing the truth values of the vari-
ables in that state. Since the single elements of the set
of security formulas have to be false for the system to
be secure, we can describe this situation directly by
the set of secure states. Indeed, guaranteeing false-
ness of each security formula corresponds to falsify-
ing the disjunction of the logical expressions repre-
senting the secure states.
Lemma 1 The state graph is connected.
Proof This follows straightforwardly by the defini-
tion of state graph. 
It would be tempting to presume that not only the
set of states is connected, but also the set of secure
states. However, this is untrue. Consider namely the
case in which the system has two variables, A and B,
so that there are four states as shown in Figure 1. Sup-
pose that the security formula is (¬A∧B)∨ (A∧¬B).
The set of secure states is formed by the state in which
both A and B are false and the state in which they are
both true. Clearly the set of secure states is then dis-
connected.
Conversely, if the set of secure states is connected,
the security formula can be written as a Horn clause
(or a set of clauses, which is equivalent). To do so,
we introduce the notion of Horn rewriting of a for-
mula: a propositional formula is a Horn clause iff it
can be written in Conjunctive Normal Form (i.e. as a
conjunction of disjunctions of literals) in which ev-
ery conjunct is formed by at most one positive literal
(This is the standard notion of Horn clause, which we
recall for preserving self-containedness.) It is well-
know that every propositional formula can be written
as a disjunction of Horn clauses.
A Horn labeling λ of the states of a system is an
assignment of the system variables to one of the cor-
responding literals. Whenever, in a Horn labeling,
λ(v) = v for a variable v, the literal v will be consid-
ered positive by that labeling, and consequently literal
¬v will be considered negative. If λ(v) =¬v, then the
literal v will be considered negative, and consequently
literal ¬v will be considered positive. We henceforth
generalize the notion of Horn clause, by stating that
a formula is a Horn clause when there exists a Horn
labeling for it that makes it a Horn clause.
In the above example, the formula can be rewrit-
ten, by applying the distributive property, as (A∨B)∧
(¬A∧¬B) and there exists a Horn labeling that makes
the formula a Horn clause: λ(A) = ¬A and λ(B) = B.
We can now prove a property that will be useful in
the following.
Lemma 2 If the set of states that correspond to a se-
curity formula is connected, then the security formula
is a Horn clause.
Proof As said above, the security formula Φ can be
written as the disjunction of the conjunctions of lit-
erals representing the interpretation of letters5 occur-
ring in the formula itself for all the secure states. We
henceforth say, when no confusion arises, that Φ is
the disjunction of secure states.
There are two methods to obtain an equivalent for-
mula Φ′ from Φ. We can use the distributive property
or we can negate the formula obtained by considering
the insecure states.
• For the first approach, since the variables of the
system all occur in each single state, the distribu-
tion provides two types of subformulas in Φ′, that
are conjuncts of the security formula: complete
conjuncts, obtained by the combination of all vari-
ables, and incomplete conjuncts, obtained by the
combination of a subset of the variables occurring
5A letter is interpreted in classical semantics. The truth
value ⊤ is represented by the positive literal, whilst the
value ⊥ is represented by the negative literal.
in the set of secure states. The incomplete con-
juncts can occur only when some variables only
occur in one form as a literal in the single dis-
juncts of the formula Φ.
• For the second method, consider the insecure
states, which form the complement set of the se-
cure states in the system. Clearly, the security for-
mula can be written as the negation of the formula
obtained as a disjunction of the insecure states.
Since the negation of a disjunctive formula is a
conjunctive formula, the obtained object is in con-
junctive normal form.
The new formula is a conjunction of disjunctions of
literals, in which every literal is the disjunction of the
complemented literals of an insecure state.
We prove that, regardless of the number of in-
volved variables, there is always a valid Horn labeling
by means of a rewriting that is, depending on the num-
ber of involved states, either based on the distributive
property or on the negation of insecure states. In fact,
given the number of states s in the set of secure states
for a given formula Φ and the number n of variables
of the system, we can have s < n+ 1, s = n+ 1 or
s > n+ 1.
(s < n+ 1) If the number of secure states is less than
or equal to the number of variables, since this
set has to be connected, by hypothesis, then the
number of complete conjuncts cannot be greater
than the number of variables. Therefore, there
is always at least one incomplete conjunct in Φ′
formed by one single literal v. If this happens,
every time that the value of that literal is ¬v, the
security formula is false, so we can rewrite the for-
mula as the conjunction of the single literal con-
juncts, and consider, as Horn labeling, the one ob-
tained by associating to the variables in the single
literal conjuncts the negation of the literals occur-
ring in those conjuncts.
(s = n+ 1) If the number of disjuncts in Φ, namely
the number of secure states, is exactly the num-
ber n+ 1, two situations can occur, in principle.
Either there are single literal conjuncts or there
are not. Actually, due to the connectedness of the
state graph, the former is impossible. If there are
single literal conjuncts, then one variable always
occurs in the same literal form in all the disjuncts
of Φ. Consider one state in the set of secure states.
To obtain all the other states in the set, we should
be able to change one variable at a time and gener-
ate in this way a new state. If the system contains
k elements, then the above described process gen-
erates k− 1 new states. But if there is one single
literal conjunct in the rewriting Φ′, then at least
one variable cannot change ever during this pro-
cess. Therefore, we can only generate n− 1 new
states contrary to the hypothesis. When a set of
states is formed in the way described above, then
every single state always contains the same num-
ber of positive and negative literals (with respect
to the trivial Horn labeling), apart from one that
contains one positive or one negative literal more
than the others. This special state can be used to
generate the correct Horn labeling for this set by
inverting each literal in the λ function (positive lit-
erals make the variables corresponding to negative
literals and vice versa).
(s > n+ 1) If the number of secure states is greater
than n+ 1, then we can consider the rewriting of
Φ obtained by negating the disjunction of insecure
states, that we call ΦU . In other words, Φ =¬ΦU .
If we distribute the literals within ΦU and obtain
the conjunctive normal form of ΦU , then applying
the negation and again distributing the literals, we
finally have a conjunctive normal form for Φ that,
based on the properties of the graph, enjoys the
same property of existence of single literal con-
juncts discussed for the case s < n+ 1. Therefore
the claim is proved.

Let us now consider a generic set of states that is
not connected. As we show in Figure 1, this may any-
how correspond to a valid Horn labeling. This, how-
ever, does not occur for every security formula. Con-
versely, every set of states can be written as the inter-
section of connected sets of states. Therefore, given
any security formula, we can represent it as the dis-
junction of the Horn clauses that are obtained by the
sets of connected states.
The purpose of Algorithm 1 is to block the agents
that apply for changing variables so to make true a
critical formula. Since a critical formula can be made
true by making true one of its disjuncts, Lemma 2 can
be used directly to prove the following Lemma 3.
More specifically, the greedy blocking works by
blocking agents when they apply for the modifica-
tion of the truth value of a variable, where the block-
ing condition is: an agent cannot perform an action
when this performance brings the system in an inse-
cure state. The synchronization proposed by the algo-
rithm is based on application time: the system simu-
lates the result of performing all (up to the maximum)
actions that agents applied for at that instant of time.
The system denies the execution to those agents that
modify variables involved in the transition of the sys-
tem into an insecure state. Since this may correspond
to more than one combination, the resulting blocked
agent set may be larger than needed. We can assume,
therefore, without loss of generality, that the algo-
rithm blocks all the agents that applied for modifying
variables that bring the system into an insecure state.
This assumption is sufficient to employ fruitfully the
generalization of Lemma 2 to generic formulas. Re-
member that H (Φ,Φ′) denotes the set of the agents
that control variables of one Horn clause in the rewrit-
ing Φ′of Φ and bring the system into an insecure state.
Lemma 3 If no agent in H (Φ,Φ′) modifies variables
occurring in Φ, and Φ is false, then Φ is false after the
modifications.
Proof This is a direct consequence of the proof of
Lemma 2. 
Since the agents blocked by the algorithm are all
those that bring the system into an insecure state, then
every agent controls variables that certainly occur in
at least one disjunct of Φ. If we rewrite Φ as a disjunc-
tion of Horn clauses (following the standard notion of
formula rewriting into disjunction of Horn clauses)
Φ′ = Φ′1∨Φ′2∨ ...∨Φ′k ,
then, by definition of this rewriting, every variable
controlled by a that occurs in Φ, occurs in at least
one of these disjuncts. If an agent that controls one
variable is blocked by our algorithm, then, by defini-
tion of the simulation, at least one of the conjuncts in
which the variable occurs in Φ′ is true. This means
that given any pair of secure states s and s′, the al-
gorithm never blocks an agent that brings the system
directly from s to s′. The extension of this property to
paths is proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 The greedy blocking method, Algo-
rithm 1, is complete.
Proof Consider two secure states s and s′, and one
agent a that controls variables occurring in Φ. Sup-
pose that s and s′ are connected by a path of length
k. If we can connect s to s′ by a path of length k,
then we can connect s to s′′ by a path of length k− 1
and directly s′′ to s′. Suppose, by contradiction, that
the greedy method blocks too many agents, so that
the system would be able to move from s′′ to s′ but
not from s to s′′. By Lemma 3, if one agent that
is not blocked by the algorithm does not apply for
changing one variable that occurs in one of the Horn
clauses that appear in a rewriting of Φ, then the for-
mula remains false. This would mean that at least
one agent, able to perform the changes of variable
values that would bring the system from s to s′, con-
trols at least one variable that does not occur in each
possible rewriting of Φ. This leads to the conclusion
that at least one variable is controlled by one agent
a, blocked by the greedy method, since a is able to
bring the system into an insecure state, from s′′ to
s′, the same variable is controlled by another agent
a′, that vice versa could move the system to an inse-
cure state and occurs in one Horn disjunct of one of
the possible rewritings of Φ, and brings the system
from s to s′′. As a consequence, one variable would
be controlled by two agents, which is contrary to the
definition of agent control of variables in the system
definition adopted here. 
Soundness and completeness of the deterministic al-
gorithm directly extend to the non-deterministic one.
Theorem 5 The non-deterministic blocking method,
Algorithm 2, is sound.
Proof The non-deterministic blocking method is an
extension of the greedy blocking method of Algo-
rithm 1 by means of an oracle. This means that every
solution of Algorithm 1 is also a solution of Algo-
rithm 2. 
Theorem 6 The non-deterministic blocking method,
Algorithm 2, is complete.
Proof The same reasoning used to prove Theorem 5
applies for completeness. 
Let us call optimal a method that blocks the small-
est sets of agents to ensure the security of the system.
The greedy blocking method guarantees just one of
the optimality properties, i.e. security, but it cannot
guarantee to block the smallest sets of agents. We thus
say that the greedy blocking method is a sub-optimal
solution.
What can further be proved is that the comparison
of the solutions computed in the non-deterministic
method generates an optimal solution. This is quite
obvious, since the solutions computed are all the pos-
sible combinations, and thus the best solution is in-
cluded in this set. What the algorithm does is find the
smallest set of agents that need to be blocked.6
Theorem 7 Algorithm 2 computes an optimal solu-
tion.
We consider here the specific problem of blocking
underhand attacks as the problem of keeping the se-
curity formula false when agents apply for changing
variables. The computational complexity of a prob-
lem is defined as the cost of the best solution. In this
case, we cannot claim that the solution is optimal and
therefore we only have an upper bound result.
Theorem 8 Blockage of underhand attacks is a poly-
nomially solvable problem on deterministic machines.
6There may exist more than one solution with the small-
est number of agents blocked. The approach of Algorithm
2 is to compare everything with everything, so the chosen
solution is the last examined one.
Proof Algorithm 1 is deterministic, sound and com-
plete, and its cost is polynomial. 
Analogously, the next result is a consequence of
the results about soundness, completeness and cost of
Algorithm 2, again in form of an upper bound.
Theorem 9 Optimal blockage of underhand at-
tacks is a polynomially solvable problem on non-
deterministic machines.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we have dealt with multi-agent systems
whose security properties depend on the values of sets
of logical formulas (the critical formulas of the sys-
tems). We assumed that the values of these formulas
can change due to actions performed by the agents of
the system, and that some attacks can be performed by
malicious agents that are authorized within the system
itself (in other terms, users of the system). These at-
tacks conducted from inside are underhand, and we
focus specifically on those attacks that are performed
by groups of individuals that do not reveal their be-
longing to such groups, that we call hidden coalitions.
We have introduced a deterministic method, im-
plemented by the greedy blocking algorithm, which
prevents attacks to the system carried out by hidden
coalitions formed by agents that are users of the sys-
tem itself. The method based on this algorithm is
sound and complete, but the algorithm is not optimal
as it cannot block the smallest set of potentially dan-
gerous agents. The method is thus extended to a non-
deterministic version that can be used, in future inves-
tigations, to identify optimal solutions and to study
extensively the computational properties of the solu-
tion, from both deterministic and non-deterministic
sides. The method is obtained by introducing an ora-
cle within the deterministic version, which makes the
soundness and completeness results directly applica-
ble to the non-deterministic version as well.
The starting point of our approach to model
multi-agent systems is Coalition Logic (Pauly, 2001;
Pauly, 2002; Pauly and Parikh, 2003), a coop-
eration Logic that implements ideas of Game
Theory. Another cooperation logic that works
with coalitions is the Alternating-time Tempo-
ral Logic (Alur et al., 1998a; Alur et al., 1998b;
Walther et al., 1997). A widely used logic, specif-
ically thought for dealing with strategies and
multi-agent systems, is the Quantified Coalition
Logic (A˚gotnes et al., 2007; A˚gotnes et al., 2008;
Wooldridge and Dunne, 2004). A specific exten-
sion, also used for agents in multi-agent systems
is CL-PC (van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005;
Troquard et al., 2009), and this is indeed the version
of Coalition Logic that we started from.
The notion of hidden coalition is a novelty, and
more generally, to the best of our knowledge, no spe-
cific investigation exists that deals with security in
open systems by means of a notion of underhand at-
tack. The system presented here is a multi-agent one,
where we did not discuss how these coalitions are
formed or the negotiations that can take place be-
fore the creation of the coalitions (Sandholm, 2004;
Kraus, 1997). For future work, it will be interesting to
consider in more detail the non-monotonic aspects un-
derlying the problem of underhand attacks by hidden
coalitions, e.g. to formalize: the mental attitudes and
properties of the intelligent agents that compose the
system, how agents enter/exit/are banned from a sys-
tem or enter/exit a hidden coalition, and the negotia-
tions between the agents for establishing the common
goal and synchronizing/organizing their actions. In
this work, we give a way to protect the system, with-
out making a distinction between the case in which
the agents that make the attack are actual members
of a coalition or not. If the system is equipped with
explicit/implicit coalition test methods, this can make
up a significant difference in terms of usefulness of
our approach.
A specific analysis of the computational properties
of our blocking methods, in particular an analysis of
worst, average, and practical cases, will be subject of
future work. Results of lower bound for the blocking
problem and the optimal blocking problem, and the
computational cost of the optimal blocking problem
on deterministic machines are in particular important
aspects to be investigated.
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